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From Europe, where I have been for the last months, it seems quintes-
sentially "anglo-saxon," in that slightly pejorative sense in which
Europeans use the term, to have selected a debate format to explore the
question of whether the Executive should continue to perform treaties
and, as a necessary part of that function, have the autonomous compe-
tence to interpret the instrument in light of changing circumstances and
needs or whether the Executive should henceforth constantly check back
with the Senate or Congress for authorizations for each new interpreta-
tion. The format creates a certain drama but it also polarizes inquiry,
presses participants and audience into a disjunctive, either-or mode and
deflects attention from the search for integrative solutions. Given my
own views on the matter, I find it particularly constraining. Though I
think Bricker Amendments, l however they try to weasel in, are mis-
guided and could not imagine myself sitting on the other side of this table
on this issue, some assertions made successively on behalf of the Carter,
Reagan and Bush administrations are equally unpersuasive.
For many citizens, the "real" issue is not the distribution of powers
between the President and the Senate with regard to treaty performance
or even the intemationallegal interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty. It's the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However,
this debate is not about whether a particular construction of the ABM
Treaty would enhance security or would lead the nation and its adversa-
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1. See M. McDOUGAL & W.M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CoNTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 1174 (1981) for text of one Bricker Amendment formulation and citations to
additional commentary.
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